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Target article: D. Borsboom, A. Cramer and A. Kalis: Brain disorders? Not really ... Why network 
structures block reductionism in psychopathology research  
 
Abstract: Borsboom, Cramer, and Kalis propose that the network approach blocks reductionism in 
psychopathology. We argue that the two main arguments, intentionality and multiple realizability of 
mental disorders, are not sufficient to establish that mental disorders are not brain disorders, and 
that the specific role of networks in these arguments is unclear.  
Main text: 
We are sympathetic to the idea that mental disorders are not just brain disorders, and the article by 
Borsboom, Cramer and Kalis does an excellent job in conveying this antireductionist message to the 
psychological community. In this commentary, however, we will show that the two main arguments 
provided (more specifically, intentionality and multiple realizability of symptoms) are not yet 
sufficient to block reductionism, and moreover, that defending antireductionism does not require 
taking a network perspective.  
The core idea of the network approach is that mental disorders should be seen as networks of 
causally interacting symptoms. A new insight that the authors put forward in the target article is that 
symptoms also often have intentional content (i.e., they are about something) and are meaningfully 
connected to one another, and that these contents and connections are not visible at the biological 
level. This seems to make explanatory reductionism impossible or, at least, very unlikely.  
This intentionality argument, however, is unlikely to sway a sophisticated reductionist. She could 
accept the importance of intentional contents and their meaningful relationships, but nevertheless 
argue that the real causal work is done by brain states. For example, it is pragmatically useful to 
describe and predict human behavior in terms of beliefs and desires, but this is consistent with the 
idea that the real causes of behavior are biological or neural (this was, roughly speaking, Dennett’s 
[1987] original view on intentional explanation). That is, even though the intentional contents of 
symptoms may have an important pragmatic or predictive role in studying mental disorders, they 
need not figure in the causal mechanisms of mental disorders. This can be illustrated with an 
analogy: The Ptolemaic system of astronomy, in which Earth is at the center of the universe and 
planets follow circular trajectories with epicycles, was a very useful predictive and descriptive tool for 
centuries, but as a representation of celestial mechanics, it is radically false.  
Thus, to block reductionism, it would have to be shown that intentional states are not only 
pragmatically important, but are also part of the causal mechanisms of mental disorders. One step 
toward this would be to show that intentional states as such, and not just the underlying brain states, 
can be treated as (interventionist) causes, and can have genuine causal relevance (along the lines of 
Eronen 2017; see also note 9 in the target article). A second step would then be to show that the 
particular intentional states that appear in psychopathological networks actually satisfy the 
conditions for causal relevance. For example, by showing that intervening on the intentional content 
of a symptom while holding other factors fixed would result in a change in another symptom. For this 
purpose, the models presently used in the network approach (e.g., vector autoregressive models or 
Markov random fields) are not yet sufficient, because they are not causal models, and the extent to 
which they give causal information is unclear (see, e.g., Bulteel et al. 2016). Moreover, even if a 
reductionist is forced to accept that symptoms with intentional contents are real causes, she could 
still maintain that these higher-level causes will be reduced in the end to neural or biological causes. 
Therefore, more is needed to stop reductionism.  
Indeed, Borsboom et al. anticipate this kind of response, and to counter it, argue that mental states 
(in this case, symptoms with intentional contents) are multiply realizable: A given mental state can be 
realized in different ways in different individuals, which seems to make it impossible to identify it 
with a single biological state. This between-individuals multiple realizability, however, is not yet 
enough to block explanatory reductionism. Even if “fear of heights” is realized by brain state X in 
John but by brain state Y in Mary, it can still be locally reducible: “Fear of heights” is brain state X in 
John’s case and brain state Y in Mary’s case (Kim 1992). That is, even though “fear of heights” might 
not be identical to a single brain state, in each specific context, it could be reduced locally to a 
specific brain state (e.g., “fear of heights” in John is identical to a brain state X). This is sufficient for 
explanatory reductionism: For example, temperature is widely regarded to be a reducible property, 
although it is realized in a different way in a solid, gas, or plasma (Bickle 2016). More generally, 
Polger and Shapiro (2016) recently have put forward a book-length skeptical account of the 
relevance of multiple realizability, arguing that most putative cases of multiple realizability can be 
explained away by a closer look at the scientific details. Thus, multiple realizability is unlikely to 
provide a strong foundation for the irreducibility of symptoms or networks.  
Finally, we would like to point out that taking the network perspective is not necessary for defending 
antireductionism in psychopathology. Debates on intentionality and multiple realizability of mental 
states have a long history in philosophy of mind, and the same applies to the other arguments put 
forward in the paper (e.g., the context-dependence and individual variation of mental states). These 
arguments predate the recent network approach, and thus, are not tied to it. What seems to be 
different compared to the earlier philosophical literature is that the focus is now on symptoms and 
their meaningful connections, and not just on intentional states in general. It is not clear, however, 
why networks would play an indispensable role in this kind of reasoning: Studying mental disorders 
by focusing on psychological symptoms and their meaningful connections does not require using 
network models or conceptualizing mental disorders as network structures (e.g., Eronen & 
Bringmann 2018; Miller 2010; Persons 1986). Thus, the specific and distinctive role of networks in the 
antireductionist arguments still needs to be clarified. Until this is done, there seems to be no need to 
adopt the recent network approach to argue that mental disorders are not brain disorders.  
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